On the Acceptability of Arguments in Preference-Based Argumentation by Amgoud, Leila & Cayrol, Claudette
1 
On the Acceptability of Arguments in Preference-based Argumentation 
Leila AMGOUD Claudette CAYROL 
Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse (1. R. I. T.) 
Universite Paul Sabatier, 118 route de Narbonne, 31062 Toulouse Cedex (FRANCE) 
E-mail: { amgoud, testemal} @irit.fr 
Abstract 
Argumentation is a promising model for reasoning 
with uncertain and inconsistent knowledge. The 
key concept of acceptability enables to differentiate 
arguments and defeaters: The certainty of a 
proposition can then be evaluated through the 
most acceptable arguments for that proposition. In 
this paper, we investigate different complementary 
points of view: an acceptability based on the 
existence of direct defeaters and an acceptability 
based on the existence of defenders. Pursuing 
previous work on preference-based argumentation 
principles, we enforce both points of view by 
taking into account preference orderings for 
comparing arguments. Our approach is illustrated 
in the context of reasoning with stratified 
knowledge bases. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Various argument-based approaches to defeasible reasoning 
have been developed [LS89], [Vre91], [Pol92], [PL92], 
[SL92], [Dun93], [EFK93], [BCDLP93], [BDP93&95], 
[Cay95a&b] [EH95], [PS96]. Particularly, argumentation 
is a promising model for reasoning with inconsistent 
knowledge, based on the construction and the comparison of 
arguments. It may be also considered as a different method 
for handling uncertainty. The basic idea behind 
argumentation is that it should be possible to say more 
about the certainty of a particular fact than the certainty 
quantified with a degree in [0, 1]. In particular, it should be 
possible to assess the reason why a fact holds, under the 
form of arguments, and combine these arguments for the 
certainty evaluation. Indeed, the process of combination 
may be viewed as a kind of reasoning about the arguments 
in order to determine the most acceptable of them. For that 
purpose, we can take into account the existence of 
arguments in favor of, or against a given fact as well as 
preference orderings for comparing pairs of arguments. 
The main approaches which have been developed for 
reasoning within an argumentation system rely on the idea 
of differentiating arguments with a notion of acceptability. 
Two kinds of acceptability have been proposed: 
- An acceptability level is assigned to a given argument 
depending on the existence of direct defeaters, or defeaters. 
That leads to the concept of acceptability class introduced 
by [EFK93] and [EH95]. 
- Acceptability with respect to a rational agent relies 
upon a notion of defense [Dun93&95]: The set of all the 
arguments that a rational agent may accept must defend 
itself against any defeater. In the following, that point of 
view will be referred to as joint acceptability. 
These notions of acceptability have been applied in a 
framework where defeat relations between arguments are 
based on the comparison of the structure of the arguments 
(l.ogical criteria). For instance, an argument supporting a gtven fact defeats an argument supporting the opposite fact. 
In that restricted framework and in the particular case of 
inconsistent knowledge bases handling, close 
correspondences have been established between the two 
notions [Cay95a]. These two kinds of acceptability have 
been proved complementary. 
Ou� pmpose is to investigate the notion of acceptability by 
takmg mto account both points of view (individual and 
joint acceptability) and by combining purely logical criteria 
and preference orderings for comparing arguments. 
In previous works, [Cay95b], we have proposed a 
methodological approach to the integration of preference 
orderings into acceptability classes. In [AC97], we have 
proposed two categories of preference-based argumentation 
frameworks with new acceptability classes. It is convenient 
to consider one such class as a set of arguments which can 
defend themselves against all attacks. This notion of 
individual defense is modeled via the preferences between 
arguments. Unfortunately, these frameworks enable to take 
into account only direct defeaters since they consider only 
one level of defeat. To illustrate that point, let us consider 
the following example: Let A, B, C be three arguments 
such that B defeats A, C defeats B, B is preferred to A and C 
is preferred to B. In that example the argument A does not 
defend itself against B. Then A will not belong to the 
acceptability class. However, B is itself defeated by C. As 
C defeats B and is preferred to B, C defends A. So, taking 
into account two levels of defeat, A should be acceptable. 
The idea �� �nforce is the following one: we accept an 
argument tf tt ts not defeated or if it defends itself against 
all attacks (for instance because it is preferred to its 
defeaters) or if it is defended by other arguments. This latter 
case corresponds to a joint defense, in the sense of Dung's 
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work. We intend to apply Dung's general construction for 
preference-based argumentation. 
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 is devoted to 
argumentation frameworks based on acceptability classes. 
Firstly, we recall the basic argumentation frameworks as 
proposed in [EFK93], in the particular case of handling 
inconsistent knowledge bases. Then, we show how 
introducing preferences into acceptability classes enables to 
define simple notion of individual defense. In section 3, we 
apply the general framework proposed by Dung to 
preference-based argumentation. We show that our proposal 
is convenient for coping with different kinds of 
acceptability. We give, in section 4, some preliminary 
results on the relationships between argumentation-based 
reasoning and prioritized-coherence based inference schemas. 
2 ARGUMENTATION FRAMEWORKS 
BASED ON ACCEPTABILITY 
CLASSES 
2. 1 BASIC DEFINITIONS 
Definition 1. An argumentation framework is a pair <JI, 
'!(? where Jl is a set of arguments and !l(.is a binary relation 
representing a defeat relationship between arguments, i.e. 1(. 
� Jlx 5t (A, B) E !l(.or equivalently "A !l(.B" means that the 
argument A defeats the argument B. Here, an argument is 
an abstract entity whose role is only determined by its 
relation to other arguments. 
Definition 2. The acceptability class w.r.t the 
argumentation framework <Jl, 1(.> is {A E JII there does 
not exist B E Jl such that B !l(.A} and will be denoted by C!l(. 
(if no ambiguity on Jl). 
In other words, the acceptability class contains the 
arguments which are not defeated by another argument. On 
the same set of arguments, for each defeat relatjon an 
acceptability class can be defined. 
Example 1. Let <!it, '!(? be the argumentation framework 
defined by Jl= {A, B, C, D} and 1(. = {(C, D), (D, C)}. The 
arguments A and B are not defeated so the acceptability 
class is C!l(. = {A, B}. 
Examples of such systems are the ones proposed by Elvang 
& al. in [EFK93] for handling inconsistency in knowledge 
bases. The arguments are built from an inconsistent 
knowledge base I = (E, K). The sets E and K contain 
formulas of a propositional language L. K represents a core 
of knowledge and is assumed consistent. Contrastedly, 
formulas of E represent defeasible pieces of knowledge, or 
beliefs. So K u E may be inconsistent. The following 
definition of argument is used: 
Definition 3. An argument of E in the context K is a 
pair (H, h), where h is a formula of the language L and H a 
subbase of E satisfying: i) K u H is consistent, ii) K u H 
� h, iii) H is minimal (no strict subset of H satisfies i and 
ii). H is called the support and h the conclusion of the 
argument. 
We denote by JI(I) the set of all the arguments which are 
constructed from a knowledge base I. The following defeat 
relations are borrowed from [EFK93]. 
Definition 4. Let (H, h) and (H', h') be two arguments of 
Jl(I). 
(H, h) rebuts (H', h') iff h = 1 -.h'. This means that an 
argument is rebutted if there exists an argument for the 
negated conclusion. 
(H, h) undercuts (H', h') iff for some k E H', h = -.k. An 
argument is undercut if there exists an argument against one 
element of its support. 
Two acceptability classes denoted respectively by CR.ebut 
and CUndercut are associated with these relations. 
CR.ebut is the set of arguments of I which are not rebutted 
by some argument of I. 
CUndercut is the set of arguments of I which are not 
undercut by some argument of I 
It can be proved that: CUndercut � CR.ebut· See [Cay95a] 
for a discussion about other defeat relations on Jl(I). 
Note that a similar methodology for defining the concept of 
"defeat" is used in [PS95&96] with the same terminology 
but with a different structure of the arguments. In 
[PS95&96), an argument is a sequence of chained 
implicative rules. Each rule has a consequent part 
(consisting of one literal) and an antecedent part (consisting 
of a conjunction of literals). The consequent of each rule in 
a given argument is considered as a conclusion of that 
argument. 
2. 2 PREFERENCE-BASED 
ARGUMENTATION FRAMEWORKS 
The notion of acceptability has been most often defined 
purely on the basis of other constructible arguments. But 
other criteria may be taken into account for comparing 
arguments. In the case of knowledge bases, for instance, 
specificity [SL92], or explicit priorities on the beliefs can 
be taken into account. More generally, preference relations 
can be used for comparing arguments. Indeed, recent works 
(for instance [Gro91], [CRS93], [Bre94], [CLS95]) have 
proved that preference relations allow for more sophisticated 
and more appropriate handling of conflict resolution and 
uncertain knowledge. (See [ACL96] for a more general 
discussion on preferences and arguments). 
To enforce the concept of acceptability used in basic 
argumentation frameworks, we have introduced in [AC97] 
preference orderings into the definition of acceptability 
classes. Instead of keeping only the arguments which are 
1= denotes logical equivalence 
not defeated, we accept also the arguments which are 
preferred to their defeaters. We say that such an argument 
defends itself against all attacks. 
Definition 5. An argument A defends itself against an 
argument B which defeats A iff A is preferred to B. 
In that sense, preference orderings model a notion of 
defense. 
Definition 6. A preference-based argumentation 
framework is a triplet <Jl, q(_, Pret> where Pref is a partial 
preordering (reflexive and transitive binary relation) on .9l x 
Jl. 
Notation: >>Pref is the strict partial ordering associated 
with Pref. 
In a preference-based argumentation framework, the 
acceptability concept can be weakened: 
Definition 7. The acceptabi l i ty class w.r.t the 
argumentation framework <Jl, q(_, Pret> is {A E JII VB E 
.9l if B 2(_ A then A >>Pref B} and will be denoted by 
Cq(_,Pref In other words, an acceptability class contains all 
the arguments which defend themselves against any attack. 
In example l ,  if we suppose that C >>Pref D, then the 
acceptability class corresponding to the argumentation 
framework <Jl, '1(, Pret> is Cq(_,Pref= {A, B, C}. 
In [AC97], from the two defeat relations "rebut" and 
"undercut" of [EFK93], we have developed two categories of 
preference-based argumentation frameworks. In each one, 
several systems can be discussed according to different 
definitions for the relation Pref. With respect to <.9l(L), 
Rebut, Pret>, the acceptability class called CRebut Pref 
gathers all the arguments which defend themselves against 
their rebutting arguments. The second category is defined by 
the triplet <.9l(L), Undercut, Pret>. The corresponding 
acceptability class, called Cundercut,Pref, gathers all the 
arguments which defend themselves against their 
undercutting arguments. (See [AC97] and [AC98a] for other 
acceptability classes and a complete study on these classes). 
The following examples will illustrate our claim: we 
consider the preference relation proposed in [BDP93] in a 
possibilistic context and based on the certainty level. In that 
case, the kp.owledge base I is supposed to be stratified in L 
= I 1 u ... u In such that beliefs in Ii have the same 
certainty level and are more reliable than beliefs in Ij where 
j > i. The certainty level of a non-empty subset H of I is 
the highest number of a layer (i.e. the lower layer) met by 
H. 
Definition 8. The certainty level of an argument (H, h) 
of Jll(I) is exactly the certainty level of the set H. 
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Example 2. Let K = 0, E =I =  It u ... u L3 be a 
knowledge base with I 1 = {a, --,a}, I2 = {a �b} and I3 = 
{ --,b}. The certainty level of the argument ( {a, a �b}, b) is 
2 whereas the certainty level of the argument ( { --,b}, --,b) is 
3, then the argument ( {a, a � b} , b) is preferred to the 
argument ( { --,b}, --,b) because it has a higher certainty level. 
We say that ({a, a �b}, b) defends itself against the unique 
rebutting argument and consequently it belongs to the 
acceptability class CRebut Pref· However, it does not 
' 
belong to CUndercut Pref because it can't defend itself 
against the undercutting argument ({-,a}, --, a) whose 
certainty level is 1. 
The framework using the classes C!l{,Pref is however too 
restricted since it discards arguments which appear 
acceptable. Intuitively, if an argument A is less preferred 
than its defeater B then it is weakened. But the defeater B 
itself may be weakened by another argument C which 
defeats B and is preferred to B. In this latter case we would 
like to accept A. To illustrate this point, let us take the 
following example. 
Example 3. Let K = 0, E = L =It u . .. u I4 with II 
= {x, --,r}, I2 = {x �t}, I3 = {t�r} and I4 = {--,r�p}. 
The argument ( {x, x�t, t�r}, r) undercuts the argument 
( {--,r, --,r�p}, p) and ( {x, x�t, t�r}, r) is preferred to ( {--,r, 
--,r�p}, p ). So ( { --,r, --,r�p}, p) does not defend itself and 
consequently it does not belong to the acceptability class 
Cundercut Pref However, the argument ( {x, x�t, t�r}, r) 
' 
is itself undercut by a preferred one, ( { x, x � t, --, r},  
--,(t�r)), and it can't defend itself. In  this case we claim that 
the argument ( { x, x � t, --,r} , --,( t � r)) defends the argument 
( {--,r, --, r� p}, p) against ({x, x� t, t� r}, r). So the 
proposition "p" may be concluded from I. 
3 JOINT ACCEPTABILITY 
3 . 1  DUNG'S GENERAL ARGUMENTATION 
FRAMEWORK 
Inspired by earlier work of Bondarenko, Kakas, Kowalski 
and Toni, [Dun93&95] has proposed a very abstract and 
general argument-based framework <.9l, Att> where Att 
denotes any attack relation between arguments. An up-to­
date technical survey of this approach is [BDKT95]. The 
basic idea is that a fact holds if an argument supporting this 
fact can be defended against all the defeaters. For a rational 
agent, an argument A is acceptable if he can defend A 
against all attacks on A. All the arguments acceptable for a 
rational agent will be gathered in a so-called extension. 
An extension must satisfy a coherence requirement as 
defined by: 
Definition 9. A set S � .9l of arguments is conflict-free 
iff no argument in S is attacked by another argument of S. 
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Definition 1 0. An argument A is defended by a set S of 
arguments (or S defends A) iff \:1 B E .9l, if B Att A then :3 
C E S such that C Att B. 
The joint acceptability requirement characterizes the 
principle: An agent can defend the arguments he accepts and 
accepts every argument he can defend. An extension 
satisfying such a requirement is defined by a fixpoint 
construction as follows: 
Definition 11 .  Let <Jl, Att> be an argumentation 
framework. Let us define a function :F as: 
:r: 2jl� 2jl 
S � J{S) = {A E Jl/ A is defended by S} 
Definition 12. A conflict-free set of arguments S is a 
complete extension iff S is a fixed point of :F. 
Another kind of extension may be defined with a stability 
requirement. 
Definition 13. Let <Jl, Att> be an argumentation 
framework. Let us define a function (j as: 
(j :  2jl� 2jl 
S � (j(S) = {A E Jl/ A is not attacked (w.r.t the 
relation Att) by S} 
Definition 1 4. A conflict-free set of arguments S is a 
stable extension iff S is a fixed point of (j. 
The following characterization can be easily proved: 
Property 1. A conflict-free set of arguments S is a stable 
extension iff each argument which is not in S is attacked by 
some argument in S. 
Note that a similar definition appears in [Pol92] and a 
variant of Dung's formalization leads to the set of justified 
arguments in [PS95&96]. 
The following results are proved in [Dun95]: 
• Let S, S' � .!'l. If S � S' then :F(S) � :F(S'). 
Let S � Jl. If S is conflict-free then :F(S) is also 
conflict-free. 
Every stable extension is a complete one, but the 
converse does not hold. 
Proof: Take .91. = {A} and Att = {(A, A)}. The empty set is 
a complete extension but it is not a stable one. 
Every argumentation framework has at least one 
complete extension. 
Moreover, we have proved [AC98b]: 
Proposition 1 .  
Let S, S' � .!'l. If S � S' then (j(S') � (j(S). 
Let S � JL S is conflict-free iff S � (j(S). 
Let S � .!'l. If S is a stable extension then S is 
maximal (for set inclusion) among the sets which are 
conflict-free. 
Let S � .!'l. :F(S) = (j o (j(S). 
In example 1, the two sets {A, B, C} and {A, B, D} are 
complete extensions and also stable extensions. {A, B} is a 
complete but not stable extension. 
3 .  2 DEFENSE IN PREFERENCE-BASED 
ARGUMENTATION 
In the context of preference-based argumentation framework 
<.9l, '.1?., Pref>, the general schema proposed by Dung will 
enable us to bypass the limit encountered with the classes 
C�Pref in section 2.2. 
Here, !1(. represents a defeat relationship based on purely 
logical properties (such as "rebut" or "undercut", for 
instance) and Pref is a preference relation based on meta­
knowledge which cannot be extracted from the arguments 
themselves. 
Definition 1 5. Let A, B be two arguments. We define B 
Att A iff B !J(. A and not (A >>Pref B). 
In other words, an argument A is attacked if it is defeated by 
another argument in the sense of !1(. and it cannot defend 
itself using Pre f. Note that in this case, a set of arguments 
S is conflict-free if each argument in S defends itself against 
its defeaters which are in S. 
Let <.9l, '.1?., Pref> be an argumentation framework. All the 
definitions 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 apply in the framework 
<.9l, Att> defined through definition 15. More precisely, we 
have: 
:F(S) = {A E Jll if B !J(.A and not (A >>Pref B), then 
there exists C e S such that C !J(.B and not (B >>Pref C)} 
(j(S) = {A E Jl/ there does not exist B E S such that B !1(. 
A and not (A >>Pref B)}, or equivalently (j{S) = { A E Jl/ if 
B E S and B !J(.A then A >>Pref B}. 
Example 4. Let <Jl, '.!(, Pref> be an argumentation 
framework where .!'l ={A, B, C}, !1(. = {(A, B), (B, C)}. Let 
us suppose that B >>Pref A and C >>Pref B then Att = 0. 
The set S = {A, B, C} is conflict-free and it is a complete 
extension. 
Our purpose is now to characterize the complete and the 
stable extensions w.r.t the class C�Pref- All the proofs can 
be found in [AC98b]. 
Proposition2. Let <Jl, '.!(, Pref> be an argumentation 
framework. 
(j{0) = Jl. 
(j( .!'l) = C'.l?.,Pref· 
For the proof see [AC98b ]. 
As a direct consequence of these results we have: 
The set C'.l?.,Pref is conflict-free. 
Proof: C'f?vPref{;; .91. then (](.91} = C'R.,Prc;[{;; (j{C'R.,Pref) 
.1{0) = C�Pref-
From classical results in fixed-point theory, the least fixed 
point of :r can be computed by iteratively applying :F to 0, 
provided that :r is continuous on the complete lattice 25!. 
Moreover, Dung has proved that :r is continuous if the 
argumentation framework is finitary (that is : for each 
argument A, there are only finitely many arguments which 
attack A). 
All the following results hold in the case of a finitary 
argumentation framework <5!, 'l?u Pref.>. Proofs can be 
found in the full report [AC98b]. 
Theorem 1. Let .S. denote the least fixed point of the 
function :r:  
.S. = u � (0), i c 0 = C�Pref u [u � (C�Pref), icl]. 
Proposition 3. The subset .S.. is conflict-free. 
Proposition 4. 
The least (for set-inclusion) complete extension is .S.. 
• Each complete (resp. stable) extension contains the 
subset .S.. 
The above result is not surprising since our aim was to 
keep the arguments which can defend themselves against all 
attacks on them and to add those which are defended by 
other arguments. 
Proposition 5. 
Let S s;:;;; J'l. If S is a fixed point of :r then y(S) is also a 
fixed point of :r. 
• y(.S.) is the greatest (for set-inclusion) fixed point of 
the function :r. 
So, each complete extension S satisfies: .S.. s;:;;; S s;:;;; y(.S..). 
Moreover, we have the equivalence: 
.S. is the unique complete extension iff Y{.S.) is conflict-free. 
In the particular context of reasoning with stratified 
knowledge bases, the argumentation frameworks <J'l(L), 
Rebut, Pref.> and <J'l(L), Undercut, Pref.> (introduced in 
section 2.2) are finitary. It is due to the use of a 
propositional language and finite knowledge bases. Then, 
all the above results hold. 
Example 3. (Continuation) We have shown that the 
argument ( {--, r, --, r� p}, p) does not belong to the 
acceptability class Cundercut Pref because it cannot defend 
itself against the argument
' 
({x, x� t, t� r}, r) which 
undercuts it. However, ( {x, x--H, t�r}, r) is itself undercut 
by ( {x, x�t, -.r}, -.(t�r)), and the argument ( {x, x�t, 
-.r}, -.(t�r)) is preferred to ({x, x�t, t�r}, r). Then we 
say that the argument ( {x, x�t, -.r}, -.(t�r)) defends the 
argument ({-.r, -.r�p}, p) and ({-.r, -.r�p}, p) E :rl 
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(Cundercut Pref). As a consequence, the argument ( {-.r, 
' 
-.r�p}, p) belongs to the least fixed point of the function 
:rand also to every complete or stable extension. 
4 RELATED ISSUES 
The coherence notion proposed in the argumentation 
frameworks <.91, � Pref.> may appear too permissive since 
*conflicting arguments may be present in the same 
extension (two arguments A and B are said *conflicting iff 
A defeats B in the sense of the relation 2{). The coherence 
may be enforced by a new definition: 
Definition 16. A set S � J'l of arguments is conflict-free 
iff no argument in the set is defeated in the sense of !!{_by 
another argument in S. In other words there doesn't exist A 
and B in S such that A !!{_B . 
That restricted coherence property is satisfied by the 
acceptability classes of the frameworks <J'l(I;), Rebut, 
Pref.> and <J'l(I;), Undercut, Pref.>. Indeed, we have: 
Proposition 6. If (H, h) E Cundercut Pref then there 
' 
does not exist (H', h') such that {H', h') undercuts (H, h) and 
(H', h') E Cundercut Pref· (The same result holds in the 
framework <J'l{I:), Rebut, Pref.>). 
Moreover, the above proposition enables to establish 
correspondences between two main approaches of reasoning 
with inconsistent knowledge bases: argumentation-based 
approaches and coherence-based approaches. In the case of 
flat bases (no preference is expressed on the beliefs), we 
have proved that the consequence relations defined through 
the argumentation frameworks <J'l{L), Undercut> and 
<J'l(I;), rebut> correspond exactly to the ones proposed 
using maximal consistent subbases in the coherence-based 
approaches [Cay95a]. For instance, in the framework 
<J'l{I:), Undercut>, the stable extensions are exactly the sets 
Arg(T) where T is a maximal (for set-inclusion) K­
consistent subset of I: and Arg(T) denotes the set of all the 
arguments whose support is included in T. Similarly, 
preference-based argumentation can be connected with 
prioritized coherence-based inference schemas (See [CLS95] 
for a thorough presentation of these inference schemas). As 
in example 3, K = 0 and I: is supposed to be stratified in 
Ll u ... u Ln· Pref is defined by the certainty level. 
Definition 17. A consistent subbase S = S 1 v . .. u Sn 
is an INCL-preferred subbase of I: if and only if V j= l ..n, 
SI u ... u � is a maximal (for set-inclusion) consistent 
subbase of 2.:1 u ... u I:j- INCL(I;) denotes the set of 
INCL-preferred subbases of I: and n INCL(I:) denotes the 
intersection of the INCL-preferred subbases of I;. B being a 
subset of J'l(I;), Supp(B) denotes the union of the supports 
of arguments of B. We have proved [AC97&AC98B]: 
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Proposition 7. 
• If T E INCL(I) then Arg(T) is a stable extension of 
the argumentation framework <51(2:), Undercut, Pref>. 
Cundercut,Prefs,;;; n INCL(I). 
It follows that: 
Cundercut,Pref s,;;; each stable extension of the 
argumentation framework <51(2:), Undercut, Pref>. 
Owing to the above results, we think that the least 
complete extension is the key concept for connecting 
argumentation-based reasoning with inference schemas 
based on coherence restauration. 
5 CONCLUSION 
The work reported here concerns the acceptability of 
arguments in preference-based argumentation. Our first 
contribution is to take into account preference relations 
between arguments in order to select the most acceptable 
arguments. The use of preferences enables to model a 
notion of individual defense. In previous work, we have 
proposed an abstract and general argumentation framework 
where an argument is acceptable only if it defends itself 
against each defeater. We have studied two applications in 
the context of reasoning with inconsistent/uncertain 
stratified knowledge bases. However, this kind of 
acceptability considers only direct defeaters of a given 
argument. Our second contribution is to enforce the concept 
of joint acceptability: an argument may be acceptable by a 
rational agent if it is defended by other arguments of the 
same agent. As this notion of defense has been proposed in 
[Dun93], we have extended our general framework by 
applying the Dung's schema. Moreover, we have obtained 
preliminary results concerning the relationship between 
preference-based argumentation and prioritized coherence­
based approaches to the handling of knowledge bases. We 
are now working in that direction. Our purpose is to 
develop a unifying framework for inference schemas coping 
with inconsistency and uncertainty. 
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